ORDER NO. 1718-11-0530

2018-01-36

Date



THE SOCIAL SERVICES APPEAL BOARD ACT SOCIAL SERVICES APPEAL BOARD

SETWEEN . APPELLANT and DIRECTOR, INTERLAKE REGION RESPONDENT Appeared before Z. JOYCE, T.ROSS, G. GLESBY , BOARD MEMBERS in: SELKIRK, Manitoba ORDER A decision was made by the Social Services Appeal Board at; CITY OF SELKIRK on JANUARY 29, 2018 , regarding Application Denled HEARING DECISION In the matter of the Vulnerable Persons with Disabilitles Act the act and an appeal of the decision of the director made on November 02, 2017 is hereby: Confirmed Rescinded Varied Referred back Other Under Section 20(1) of The Social Services Appeal Board Act, the board orders: Enrol In the Community Living disABILITYServices Program Reasons for decision are attached Section 23 of The Social Services Appeal Board Act reads: 23(1) Any party to the appeal before the appeal board may appeal the board's order to the court of appeal on any question involving the board's jurisdiction or on a point of law, but only after obtaining leave to appeal from a judge of the court of appeal. 23(2) An application for leave to appeal must be made within 30 days after the date of the appeal board's order, or within any further time that a judge allows, 23(3) The parties to the appeal before the appeal board, and the appeal board, are entitled to be heard on the application for leave to eppeal and on the appeal itself. Under Section 24 of The SSAB Act, the Court of Appeal may do the following: e) quash, vary or confirm the order of the appeal board, or b) refer the malter back to the appeal board for further consideration in accordance with any direction of the court

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Chairperson, SSAB

Reasons for Decision:

Order #AP1718-01-0623

On November 30, 2017, filed an appeal on behalf of the who was denied eligibility for Community Living disABILITY Program (CLdS) services.

In order to be eligible for services under CLdS, an individual must be deemed to be a vulnerable person under *The Vulnerable Persons Living with a Mental Disability Act* ("the Act").

Under the Act, a vulnerable person is defined as:

an adult living with a mental disability who is in need of assistance to meet other basic needs with regard to personal care or management of his or her property.

The Act defines "mental disability" as:

Significantly impaired intellectual functioning existing concurrently with impaired adaptive behavior and manifested prior to the age of 18 years, but excludes a mental disability due exclusively to a mental disorder as defined in Section 1 of The Mental Health Act.

On February 19, 2016, an application was made to CLdS on behalf. A psychological assessment was not completed until May, 2017. At the same time as the St. Amant assessment report was completed, the supervising psychologist at St. Amant completed an Assessment of Intellectual Functioning.

The supervising psychologist indicated reservations about the reliability of the assessment results, although did not elaborate on the effect of r reservations. The Department referred the assessment results to an external psychologist, for review, r confirmed the results of the St. Amant assessment on September 19, 2017.

On November 2, 2017, the Department sent . letter advising that had been determined to be ineligible for the program, due to the fact that it did not have significantly impaired intellectual functioning. The letter referenced the Act, but did not expand on how failed to meet the criteria.

This decision by the Department led to the appeal filed by the '

attended the hearing with an advocate. parents, and two individuals who are part of support network, and who spoke on leabhalf. The parents are appealing the Department decision on three grounds:

- That "Full Scale IQ (FSIQ) score does indicate significantly impaired intellectual functioning;
- 2. That even if the large difference in subtest results casts doubt on the reliability of the FSIQ score, that a correct reading of the DSM-V diagnostic criteria would take into

- account impaired adaptive functioning in determining the extent of intellectual disability; and
- 3. The Department's policy on determining whether significantly impaired intellectual functioning exists is inconsistent with the intent of the Act and the values embodied in Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

At the hearing, the Chair ruled that a hearing on the merits of the case would be held first, and then Charter arguments would be heard.

regarding challenges with daily living. The testimony primarily focused on adaptive functioning, and provided the Board with significant detail on the intensive supervision requires at home, at school and in the community while performing the most basic of tasks.

The Board noted the presentation of t Learning Support Teacher, stated in had 30 student files open to students qualify for CLdS. stated that ranks in top 5 for needs and services, ahead of many who have qualified for CLdS.

advocate challenged the Department's finding that did not have significantly impaired intellectual functioning. The psychometrist at St. Amant determined that FSIQ score was in the Extremely Low range, which indicates an IQ two standard deviations from the mean. A FSIQ score two standard deviations from the mean indicates significantly impaired intellectual functioning.

advocate also noted that cognitive assessments completed in 2005 and 2009 also determined Full Scale score was in the Extremely Low range.

The advocate challenged the Department's reliance on the DSM-IV diagnostic criteria, noting that DSM-V has been the standard since 2013. The advocate maintained the Department's reliance on DSM-IV ignored DSM-V's emphasis on reading the cognitive assessment in conjunction with the adaptive functioning assessment, particularly where the FSIQ score is marginally less than two standard deviations from the mean.

Furthermore, the advocate maintained that the Department's requirement that an assessment be current and conclusive is not contained in the Act. When the Act is read as a whole, the legislative intent clearly is that supports be provided to vulnerable people in need. The Department's restrictive view of what constitutes a conclusive assessment has the effect of unduly denying supports to vulnerable people. The advocate stated the Board was not required to apply a policy in its decision, particularly if the policy is inconsistent with the underlying Act.

Finally, advocate stated that report was only a file review, and relied primarily on DSM-IV. did not meet with n, or perform any new tests. The advocate suggested report should not be viewed as an independent assessment.

In its presentation to the Board, the Department contended that the appeal hinged on the narrow issue of whether or not \(\) I has significantly impaired intellectual functioning, and is therefore a disabled person under the Act. The Department asserted that the Board must decide within the framework of the Act, and that questions about the fairness or effectiveness of the legislative framework are not relevant to the appeal.

The Department agreed the Board is not required to strictly apply the policy. While policies are useful in that they provide transparent, consistent and reasonable decision making, in cases of inconsistency the Board must apply the Act. Courts have ruled that administrative decision makers must have flexibility to vary policy to account for specific circumstances.

The Department asserted that there is no inconsistency between the policy and the Act. The Departmental policy is reasonable, appropriate and conforms to the legislative intent,

The Department maintained the Board must read the Act, think of what its intent is, and then look at the evidence to determine if neets the 3 criteria contained in the definition of mental disability:

The Department and advocate agreed that the three criteria to be evaluated are:

- 1. significantly impaired intellectual functioning
- 2. impaired adaptive behaviour
- 3. manifested prior to the age of 18 years

The Department maintained that the definition of mental disability in the Act is reflective of the criteria contained in DSM-IV. The Department suggested that the wording of the Act is sufficiently close to DSM-IV that the legislative drafters must have had knowledge of the DSM-IV criteria and consciously incorporated it into the Act.

There was considerable discussion at the hearing regarding a reliance on DSM-IV rather than DSM-V. advocate maintained the DSM-V was the current standard and that DSM-IV should not be used. The Department noted that DSM-V did not exist at time the legislation was enacted. However, the Department asserted the diagnostic criteria in DSM-V are substantially similar to DSM-IV and the Act. The Department acknowledged that DSM-V places more emphasis on adaptive functioning, and that clinicians have a little more flexibility in interpreting IQ scores.

The DSM-V criteria for a significant intellectual disability are:

- A. Deficits in intellectual functions, such as reasoning, problem-solving, planning, abstract thinking, judgment, academic learning and learning from experience, and practical understanding confirmed by both clinical assessment and individualized, standardized intelligence testing.
- B. Deficits in adaptive functioning that result in failure to meet developmental and sociocultural standards for personal independence and social responsibility. Without ongoing support, the adaptive deficits limit functioning in one or more activities of daily life, such as communication, social participation, and independent living, and across multiple environments, such as home, school, work, and recreation.
- C. Onset of Intellectual and adaptive deficits during the developmental period

The Parties agreed that met the definition of intellectual disability for criteria B and C.

Neither Party disputed secores on the cognitive assessments. However, there was a fundamental disagreement on both the significance of subtest results relative to FSIQ Score, and the role impaired adaptive behaviour plays in determining a significant intellectual disability.

Much of the argument at the hearing hinged on how the DSM-V criteria ought to be interpreted. At issue is the following paragraph in the DSM-V:

IQ test scores are approximations of conceptual functioning but may be insufficient to assess reasoning in real-life situations and mastery of tasks. For example, a person with an IQ score above 70 may have such severe adaptive behavior problems in social judgment, social understanding, and other areas of adaptive functioning that the person's actual functioning is comparable to that of individuals with a lower IQ score, thus, clinical judgment is needed in interpreting results.

At the hearing, the Department took a restrictionist approach to this passage. The Department argued that, although FSIQ score was two standard deviations from the mean, the variability in his subtest results and the presence of hearing and vision issues rendered the FSIQ inconclusive. The Department repeatedly stated that I was required by DSM-V to exercise clinical judgment, and that a reasonable exercise of that judgment would be to downgrade the significance of the FSIQ Score.

The Department policy is the assessment information must be current and conclusive. The policy defines conclusive as (1) providing a clinical conclusion or interpretation of the derived scores establishing that the individual presents with significantly impaired intellectual functioning; and (2) does not contain any reservations or conditions that would influence the validity of the results.

The Department maintained that, to be eligible, an individual must meet all three criteria fully and separately.

advocate argued that the change from DSM-IV to DSM-V was intended to be expansionary. In other words, the purpose of increasing the emphasis on adaptive functioning was to capture those persons whose IQ scores were marginally above the threshold, but whose adaptive functioning reduced their actual functioning to a level comparable to that of individuals with a lower IQ score.

advocate noted that FSIQ score met the threshold level. Even if the variability in subtest results introduced an element of uncertainty, the uncertainty put into the threshold range, where the level of adaptive functioning must be considered to determine if the level of actual functioning is comparable to that of individuals with a lower IQ score.

The Board is not persuaded by the Department's argument that all three DSM criteria must be met separately and fully for a determination of significantly impaired intellectual functioning to be made. The Board is of the view that a plain language reading of the DSM-V

passage above indicates that the criteria of impaired intellectual functioning and impaired adaptive functioning must be evaluated together, as one may affect the other.

The Board agrees with the Department that the definitions in the Act are, at the very least, inspired by DSM-IV, and are on balance of probabilities based on DSM-IV. The Board does not accept that the Legislature intended to freeze the standard of practice for evaluating significant intellectual impairment at the DSM-IV standard. To do so would be to require clinical psychologists to use outdated standards when evaluating provincial clients.

The Board does not agree that the Department policy reflects the standards contained in DSM-V, and consequently the policy does not reflect the intent of the Act, particularly the intent of supporting vulnerable persons in developing their capacity. The Board finds that the criteria of impaired intellectual functioning and impaired adaptive functioning must be evaluated together.

Having determined that the two criteria must be evaluated together, the Board must then turn its attention to the specifics of case.

Over the course of young life, has had three cognitive assessments completed. All three assessments found that his FSIQ score was in the Extremely Low range, advocate noted this in her presentation to the Board. The Department's response focused on the reliability of the individual assessments, and did not address the consistency over time between the three assessments.

The Board noted the St. Amant report did not include the actual scores from the cognitive testing. The 2009 report from gave the range of the Full Scale score as 60 – 69, implying mid-point of 65, which is well below the threshold of 70.

The Department's policy requires the assessment to be conclusive, but the Act does not define the term. In the absence of legislative definition, the Department requires the psychologist conducting the assessment to express no reservations about the reliability or validity of the results, which implies a requirement for 100% certainty. The Board notes that evidence can be conclusive without requiring 100% certainty.

The St. Amant assessment report stated that FSIQ score could not be interpreted as a unitary measure of overall functioning because of the variability in subtest scores. The Department relied heavily on this statement in finding that did not have significantly impaired intellectual functioning.

The supervising psychologist at St. Amant completed an Assessment of Intellectual Functioning Form. stated that 3 had reservations about the reliability of the testing based on hearing and vision deficits.

The Board noted that earlier evidence suggested that shearing and vision deficits are correctable with glasses and hearing aids. In response to a question from the Board about what was the nature of the supervising psychologist's reservations about the effect of vision and hearing deficits, the Department stated that it only had the wording on the form to rely on and the psychologist was not present to speak to the issue.

The Board does not understand why the Department's response to a test that has reservations about functional testing issues attached to it is to deny eligibility, rather than to reconduct the test.

The Board is concerned that the Department's policy on conclusive results does not recognize that all people have widely varying strengths and weaknesses, and does not reflect the Act's structured approach to assessing and reflecting the varying capacities of vulnerable persons. A de facto requirement that all indices must be in the Extremely Low range to override concerns about variability would have the effect of denying eligibility to people near, but below, the threshold of 70.

The Board finds that the weight of the evidence presented to it indicates that cognitive functioning is in the Extremely Low range. To the extent that the variability in the subtest scores creates uncertainty about the reliability of the FSIQ score, the Board notes the Department submitted no evidence suggesting that the uncertainty indicates that is materially above the threshold of 70. Applying the plain language reading of the DSM-V criteria, the Board finds that significant intellectual deficits, combined with his severe adaptive functioning deficits, means that he meets the definition of significantly impaired intellectual functioning.

As the Department has conceded that has impaired adaptive behavior and that deficits were manifested prior to the age 18, the Board finds that, within the framework of the Act, nas a mental disability and is a vulnerable person eligible for services under the Act. The decision of the Director has therefore been rescinded. The Board orders that the deemed eligible for services under the Community Living disABILITY Program.

Charter arguments

advocate raised two Charter of Rights and Freedoms issues prior to the hearing. The Department reserved its position on the requirement for notice under the Constitutional Questions Act.

advocate submitted there were ambiguities in the Act, and that court decisions have held that any ambiguity in an act must be resolved in favor of Charter values.

Briefly, the advocate argued that any ambiguities in the Act must be resolved consistent with the Charter values of meaningful inclusion, equality, and non-discrimination that are embodied in Sections 7 and 15. The Department's policy on determining significantly impaired intellectual functioning violates security of person under Section 7, and equality rights under Section 15.

Based on the advocate's argument, the Department understood that the advocate was not asking the Board to find that any part of the Act offends the Charter, and was not seeking a section 24 remedy. The Department's understanding is that the *Constitutional Questions Act* does not come into play under those circumstances.

The Department noted : advocate wanted the Board to use Charter values as an interpretive aid where the Act is ambiguous. The Department submitted that, while the Board must exercise its discretion in the context of Charter values, it is also bound by the Act.

The Department submitted that the Supreme Court has always treated Section 7 as a negative right, and has never placed an obligation on a government to provide programs and services to promote or maintain life, liberty or security of person.

The Department agreed that Section 15(1) embodies the values of equality and social inclusion. However, the framers of the Charter were aware that there may be unintended consequences, such as the Charter being used in reverse discrimination cases. The framers included Section 15(2), which states a program does not violate the 15(1) guarantee if a government can demonstrate that the program has an ameliorative purpose and it is targeted at a 15(1) group. The Department's position is that the CLdS program has an ameliorative purpose, targeted to a specific class of mental disability to the exclusion of others.

Having already determined that, based on the evidence, meets the criteria for eligibility for the CLdS program, the Board declines to rule on the Charter arguments made before it.

Date: February 7, 2018

Z. Joyce, Chairperson

J. G. Glesby, Member

T. Ross, Member